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Taxation of Business Income
Jennifer L. Blouin
One of the most significant issues facing U.S. lawmakers is the
fiscal deficit. There is no question that the U.S. government’s
expenditures are outpacing its revenues. To mitigate the growing
deficit, lawmakers can reduce spending, increase revenues, or
some combination of both.
Most Democrats and Republicans agree
that spending should be cut and revenues
increased—but that, however, is the only
thing on which they agree. Holding all else
equal, tax revenues can be raised either by
increasing tax rates or by increasing the
tax base (i.e., the income subject to taxes).
Democrats tend to favor increasing tax
rates whereas Republicans support broadening the tax base through growth and
the curtailing of deductions (“loopholes”).
Almost all of this debate centers on tax
rates on individuals.

Interestingly, one aspect of tax policy on
which both sides of the aisle seem to agree
is the need to reduce the U.S. corporate tax
rate. Currently, U.S. corporations face a top

statutory tax rate of 35%. This rate is quite
high as compared to other OECD countries, which assess an average rate of 24%.1
Proposals for corporate tax reform suggest
that the corporate tax rate should be reduced
to 28%. The arguments supporting this rate
cut generally claim that this reduction is
necessary to make the U.S. competitive with
other jurisdictions for the location of new
businesses and, hence, economic growth.2
Despite the ongoing debate on raising/
lowering individual and corporate tax rates,
there is little clarity on lawmakers’ positions
regarding business income, more generally.
The issue is that many presume, wrongly,
that all business income is taxed at corporate
rates. However, this ignores businesses orga-
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nized as non-corporate organizations, such
as sole proprietorships, partnerships, limited
liability companies (LLCs), and S corporations: the bastions of small businesses and
entrepreneurial capital.
In terms of employment, the Small
Business Administration and Census
Bureau report that over 50% of the U.S.
workforce is employed by firms with 500
or fewer employees, with 30% employed by
firms with no more than 100 employees. In
terms of sheer numbers, sole proprietorships are the most common form of business
organization in the U.S. Small businesses
have been lobbying heavily for some sort of
potential reprieve from the reversion of individual tax rates to pre-2003 levels, arguing
that the rate increase will hurt their growth.3
These groups maintain that the increase in
personal tax rates will differentially affect
small businesses relative to larger businesses.
On the other hand, opponents claim
that reductions in tax rates on non-corporate
business income will simply be a windfall to
wealthy taxpayers.4
Both perspectives have merit. Noncorporate small businesses income will face
a tax increase AND there are significant
amounts of non-corporate business income
reported on returns of wealthy taxpayers.
But I believe that many (but by no means
all) of the “wealthy” taxpayers that pundits
argue would unfairly benefit from a reduction in tax rates on non-corporate business
income only appear wealthy because of the
non-corporate business income that they
report on their business returns.
In this paper, I will discuss the most
common structures of legal entities for U.S.
businesses (corporate and non-corporate
forms), their tax treatment, their contribution to U.S. tax revenues, and how the
anticipated changes in tax policy could affect
businesses tax obligations. By doing so, I
hope to present readers with a deeper understanding of the issues affecting the tax burdens of non-corporate business entities and
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See http://taxfoundation.org/article/oecd-corporateincome-tax-rates-1981-2012.
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the implications arising from the different
ways in which corporate and non-corporate
entities are taxed.

I.
Organizational
Structures
An entrepreneur who establishes a business
has several legal options when selecting a
structure for his/her enterprise. Although
taxes most certainly play a significant role
in the choice of entity, there are other legal
and transactional cost considerations as
well. For example, a small service provider
(such as a landscaper) may not be interested
in incurring the legal and accounting costs
of setting up a business as a separate legal
entity and so may choose simply to report
business activity on his/her personal tax
return. Each of the common organizational
structures is discussed below: C corporations, sole proprietorships, S corporations,
partnerships and LLCs. In addition to these
four structures, the U.S. also has others for
mutual funds (Regulated Investment Companies, or RICs) and real estate (Real Estate
Investment Trusts, or REITs) that are only
available to be used in specific industries and
thus will not be discussed in this brief.

C Corporations
A C corporation is the basic structure
subject to corporate taxation. C corporations are separate entities for both legal and
tax purposes. From a legal perspective, the
benefit of the C corporation structure is that
its owners have limited liability, meaning
that if the corporation declares bankruptcy,
the owners simply lose their investment in
the corporation. They cannot be pursued
by the firm’s creditors. From a tax perspective, the U.S. subjects C corporations to a
double taxation or “classical” regime. Under
a classical regime, the corporation files a tax
return, pays corporate taxes and then any
profits owners earn from their investment

nfib.com/advocacy/taxes.
4
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in the corporation are taxed again. These
investor profits can come directly from
the C corporation in the form of either a
share repurchase or a dividend. However, a
corporation need not distribute its profits
in order to trigger the second layer of tax.
Secondary trading on the market results in
the recognition of taxable capital gains, thus
effectively subjecting the corporate profits to
two layers of tax.5
For example, suppose a U.S. corporation
earns $100 of pre-tax income. Assuming
that the corporation faces a 35% tax rate,
the firm will pay $35 in corporate taxes
and there will be $65 of retained earnings
available to be distributed to shareholders.
Under the current tax regime, individual
shareholders face a maximum tax rate of
20% on dividends and up to a 39.6% tax rate
on ordinary (i.e., non-investment) income.
If the corporation distributes 10% of its
after-tax profits, then the shareholders will
receive a $6.50 dividend on which they
will owe $1.30 in tax resulting in after-tax
proceeds of $5.20. So, the $10 of pre-tax
corporate profits represented by the dividend
is effectively taxed at 48.0%. Note that the
expiration of the 2003 tax rate reductions
accompanied by the implementation of the
3.8% Medicare tax on investment income
(due to the Affordable Care Act) will result
in the $10 of pre-tax corporate profits incurring a combined tax rate of 63.21%.
The mitigation of double taxation of
corporate profits was a key driver of the
2003 reductions in the dividend and capital
gains tax rates. Furthermore, avoiding the
double taxation of corporate profits is one
of the primary reasons for the popularity
of conduit or pass-through organizational
forms, which will be discussed below. 6
Yet, despite the tax disadvantages
described above, most large firms (e.g. General Electric, Dell, Boeing, Apple, Goldman
Sachs, etc.) and a large fraction of mediumsized firms are organized as C Corporations. Furthermore, C corporations have not

As an aside, many countries have an imputation or frank-
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For example, in the 1950s-1970s, C corporations faced

See the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities’ 2009

ing system to mitigate double taxation (e.g., Australia,

See Treasury Secretary Timothy Geithner’s February

study titled “Very few small business owners would face

U.K.). These systems eliminate the double taxation of

2012 testimony before the House Ways and Means Com-

increases under president’s budget” by Chye-Ching

corporate profits by effectively attaching some (or all) of

mittee on “The President’s FY2012 Budget Proposal.”

Huang, Jason Levitis, and James Horney.

the corporate tax payment to the dividend in the form of

to prevent abusive behavior. The built-in-gain sting tax on

Note that presumably the firm’s retention of its profits

a tax credit thereby reducing the individual shareholder’s

S Corporations and the tax treatment of publicly-traded

results in the appreciation of the equity.

dividend-related tax obligation.

partnerships are examples.

See the National Federation of Independent Business’s
perspective on the individual rate increases: http://www.
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tax rates around 48% whereas individuals’ top tax rates
varied between 70 and 90%.
8

There are some special taxes assessed on pass-throughs

always been tax-disfavored relative to other
organizational forms.7 Many organizations
may have selected the C corporation form
based on past tax regimes and, once an
enterprise is a C corporation, it can be very
difficult, if not impossible, for the enterprise
to convert to a conduit.

Conduit or Pass-Through
Structures

Figure 1A: The Number of Different Organizational Structures Filing Returns
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Data for this Figure was obtained from the Statistics of Income data found on the IRS website.

ures 1A and 1B demonstrate that conduits
constitute a significant and growing portion
of U.S. taxable income.
To compare the aggregate tax burden
of the conduit to that of the C corporation,
I rely on the same fact pattern outlined
above in the C corporation example. If the
conduit has $100 of pre-tax income, all $100
must pass through and be reported on its
owners’ tax returns. Note that the income
is reported by the owners on their returns
regardless of whether the conduit entity
distributes any cash. Assuming that owners
face a 39.6% statutory tax rate, they will
report the $100 and owe taxes of $39.60 to
the U.S. tax authorities. Cash distributed by

limitations (e.g., tax credits and Section 179 accelerated

a special tax treatment (called separately stated items)

depreciation).
10

C Corporations
S Corporations

4.0

Each category of income or deduction that may have
in the hands of its owners maintains its character as it

the conduit does not create any incremental tax liability.11 If the conduit distributes
cash to its owners, suppose $5.20 (i.e., the
after-tax cash owners of the C corporation
received), this amount would not create any
incremental tax obligation. However, notice

from 1980 to 2008

Conduit or pass-through entities are a
category of organizational structures that are
generally subject to only one layer of tax.8
They are designated as “conduit” entities
because their income passes through the
entity and is taxed in the hands of its owners. Since conduits are not taxed separately,
the income maintains its character as it
flows through to the returns of its owners.
So, unlike C corporations, where income is
effectively converted to either dividends or
capital gains, conduit entities typically result
in their owners reporting ordinary income.9
Because Treasury exempts passthroughs from two layers of tax, it places
limitations on the attributes of the entities eligible to operate in such forms. For
example, S corporations are only allowed to
have 100 shareholders (and partnerships,
corporations, and foreign individuals are
ineligible shareholders) and one class of
stock. Partnerships and LLCs, on the other
hand, are precluded from accessing public
equity unless their income is predominantly
passive in nature (e.g., dividends, interest,
capital gains, etc.).10 There are no IRS-specific limitations on sole proprietorships, but
these entities are somewhat disadvantaged
as they provide no legal protection for their
owners. In addition, sole proprietorships
imply one owner, so there is no mechanism
for a sole proprietorship to have additional
investors. Although sole proprietorships, S
corporations, partnerships, and LLCs each
differ in form, the impact of taxes on these
entities’ after-tax returns (or cash flows) is
quite similar.

9

Figure 1A shows that sole proprietorships are the most common form of business
organization. But in 2008, they reported less
than 20% of aggregate U.S. business income
(Figure 1B), implying that the average sole
proprietorship is quite small. Overall, Fig-

that the owners have a net cash outflow
of $34.40 related to their investment in
the conduit—the $39.60 paid to the tax
authorities less the $5.20 received from the
business. To prevent conduit-related tax
obligations from negatively affecting owners’
cash flow, conduit entities often have tax
sharing agreements that require the entity to
distribute a percentage of its profits (usually
pre-tax income times the top personal statutory tax rate) to its owners to cover their tax
obligations.
With a tax sharing agreement in place,
the conduit will distribute $39.60 in cash
to its owners for tax purposes in addition to
the $5.20 of cash described above. Under

private equity).
11

other income if the investor is an active participant in the

This assumes that the shareholder has basis in their

underlying business (i.e., the investment is not passive).
13

The publicly traded partnership (or PTP) rules effectively

shares that equals the amount of the distribution. Basis

passes through to owners. For example, any dividends,

subject the partnership to corporate tax rules if the part-

is roughly what the investor paid for his/her ownership

Kitchen, James Pearce, and Richard Prisinzano, “Meth-

capital gains, or tax credits are broken out in the conduit’s

nership is listed on an exchange – i.e. double taxation.

interest plus (minus) the conduit’s profits (losses) minus

odology to Identify Small Businesses and Their Owners,”

tax reporting as the owners may face beneficial tax rates

However, if the PTP only participates in passive income

any distributions to owners.

Office of Tax Analysis, Technical Paper 4, August 2011.

(as is the case with dividends or capital gains) or particular

activities, it may maintain its pass-through status (i.e.,

Investors in conduit entities may only use losses to offset

Using a sample of 2007 returns, the authors define non-

12

Matthew Knittel, Susan Nelson, Jason DeBacker, John

this scenario, the conduit will have $55.20 of
profits retained inside the conduit (less than
the $58.50 of “retained earnings” in the C
corporation example). However, as the $5.20
additional distribution does not create an
incremental tax burden (i.e., it is not considered a dividend), the owners are able to
retain the entire $5.20. As a result, the effective tax rate on the profits of the conduit is
39.6%—only the shareholder level tax.

III.
Taxation of Conduits
and C Corporations:
A Comparison
There is a conundrum created in the above
example. Notice that although the aggregate
tax rate on the distributed profits is less for
the conduit (39.6% v. 48%), the conduit
entity and its owners actually end up paying
more tax than the C corporation and its
shareholders ($39.60 v. $36.30). This incremental tax of $3.30 is primarily attributable
to the conduit income being taxed at the
higher individual ordinary rates. The C corporation would have to increase its dividend
to $23.00 before the aggregate tax liability
of the C corporation and its shareholders is
as great as the burden on the conduit and its
owners.
The relative tax advantage of the
conduit hinges critically on the timing of
the second layer of corporate tax. If a C
corporate shareholder intends to hold an
investment for his/her lifetime, as would
often be the case in a family-run business,
then the present value of the tax on the sale
of the organization is very small. Similarly,
reinvestment of profits in a corporation
decreases current period payout (dividends
or repurchases), also decreasing the present
value of any investor-level tax.
Another important consideration in the
choice between C corporations and passthrough structures is the treatment of losses.
Just as a conduit entity passes through all

14

items of income, it also passes through
losses.12 Owners may then use these losses
to offset other items of income on their tax
returns. C corporations must retain all losses
inside the corporation. These corporate
losses, called net operating losses, are only
available to offset future income of the C
corporation. This asymmetric treatment of
losses is one reason that the conduit entity is
preferred over the C corporation for start-up
businesses. Because conduit owners are able
to use the losses from the conduit to shield
other income (perhaps wage income from
a spouse), then the losses can effectively
provide another source of financing for the
pass-through (as the owner now has more
available capital to invest).
Although it is very costly for a profitable C corporation to convert to a conduit,
it is relatively straightforward for a conduit
to convert to a C corporation. Typically,
once an enterprise requires access to external
capital markets to raise funds for growth, it
becomes a C corporation. C corporations
provide the easiest mechanism to sell ownership to a diffuse investor base and are also
afforded the opportunity to defer taxation
on foreign earnings (an option not available
to conduit entities). There are some publiclytraded partnerships (PTPs) that trade on
major exchanges. However, the IRS limits
the types of income that these entities can
earn to qualifying passive income (i.e., rents,
royalties, capital gains, dividends, interest
etc.). If a PTP is found to have significant
non-qualifying income, the PTP will be
taxed as a C corporation.

IV.
What types and size
of businesses are represented by conduits?
Debate about the effects of individual tax
rate increases on pass-through entities centers on their potentially deleterious effects
on the growth of small businesses and entre-

preneurial endeavors. But there is enormous
variation in the types of businesses using the
pass-through structure. Investment partnerships use the conduit form to hold portfolio
assets, allowing the tax-efficient sharing
of risk across partners. Law firms, medical
practices, and accounting firms are but a
few of the categories of professional service
firms that rely on pass-through structures.
Although sole proprietorships are the most
common form of conduit, many of these
filings represent taxpayers who are independent contractors (i.e., their pay is reported
on a 1099-MISC instead of a W-2). For
these taxpayers, the income from the sole
proprietorship is almost identical to salary.
To evaluate entities whose tax returns
often include business activities, a group
from the Office of Tax Analysis (OTA) created a methodology to distinguish between
business and non-business activity, and
then between large and small businesses.13
Ultimately, 55% of conduit entities are classified as businesses, 99% of which are “small”
businesses. Business activity represents 93%
of the net income reported on pass-through
returns, whereas small business activity
represents 25% of pass-throughs’ reported
net income.
This OTA study also seeks to identify
what portion of the businesses’ pass-through
income is reported on high tax rate personal
returns—i.e., those that would be affected
by potential individual income tax rate
increases. Of personal income tax returns
reporting business income (as defined by
the study), 12% represent taxpayers with
adjusted gross income (AGI) of $200,000 or
more. These 12% of taxpayers report 79% of
all business income. Consistent with small
businesses reporting lower levels of income
(which is by the study’s design), 11% of
personal tax returns reporting small business
income have AGIs of at least $200,000 and
they report 64% of the aggregate net income
of the small business. Roughly half of all
personal returns reporting large business

business entities to be those that either have $5,000 or

New York: Oxford University Press, 1970. Neoclassical

based on the technological progress of the economy.

workers or in the education of its existing workers. Note

less of deductions or total income or deductions (the sum

economic theory predicts that growth merely depends on

So, when there is greater technological innovation, there

that under the neoclassical theory, the transitory effects of

of total income and deductions) of $10,000 ($15,000) or

the accumulation of capital (both physical – such as prop-

will be greater economic growth irrespective of tax policy.

less. Any business filing that has $10 million or less of

erty, plant and equipment; and human - workforce). In the

However, changes in tax policy are predicted to create

total income and total deductions are classified as small

long-run, the level of taxes affects the optimal weighting

transitory growth as the economy reallocates between

Economic Growth,” Journal of Public Economics 89

businesses.

between the two types of capital, but not the level of

physical and human capital. For example, if new technol-

(5-6), 2005, p.1027-1043 and Robert E. Hall and Dale

See Robert M. Solow Growth Theory: An Exposition.

growth. Rather, growth is effectively pre-determined

ogy is discovered then firms may invest more in new

W. Jorgenson, “Tax Policy and Investment Behavior.”

a tax change can reverberate over decades.
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See Roger H. Gordon and Yong Lee, “Tax Structure and

Figure 2:

Impact of Individual Tax Rate Increases on S Corporations
2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

Working Capital	

469,051,572

521,828,993

580,441,465

573,861,462

552,099,718

Net Income

348,078,943

373,091,660

380,026,863

360,625,661

330,512,003

Estimated Shareholder Distributions

224,872,229

208,278,542

249,963,266

275,374,638

236,609,436

Incremental Tax Distribution (5%)

17,403,947

18,654,583

19,001,343

18,031,283

11,044,458

Cumulative Incremental Tax Distribution

17,403,947

35,950,530

54,951,873

72,983,156

84,027,614

3.7%

6.9%

9.5%

12.7%

15.2%

Cumulative Distribution as a % of Working Capital	

Working Capital is current assets less current liabilities. Net Income is aggregate net income from profitable S corporations. Estimated Shareholder Distributions are computed by adding current year’s aggregate
net income to prior year’s retained earnings and then subtracting current year’s retained earnings. Incremental Tax Distribution is 5% (the difference between current tax rates and anticipated tax rates on ordinary
income) of Net Income from profitable S corporations. Cummulative Incremental Tax Distribution is the accumulated incremental distribution from 2005. All amounts are aggregate dollars in thousands. All data
were collected from Statistics of Income.

income face AGIs of $200,000 or more and
these taxpayers report 106% of the large
business net income. Overall, it appears
quite clear that a large share of conduit
entities will be affected by the increase in
personal tax rates.

V.
Impact of the Proposed
Rate Changes
Corporate Rate Reduction
Research generally suggests that lowering
the tax rate on C corporations increases
growth.14 So, it seems likely that any reduction of the corporate tax rate will promote
growth in the corporate sector.15,16 To the
extent these reductions are accompanied by
increasing rates elsewhere, these beneficial
effects may be partially offset.

Individual Income Tax Rate
Increase
Proposed changes in individual tax rates
affect the ordinary income tax rates as well
as the tax rates on dividends and capital
gains. For purposes of the discussion of
the effects of tax rate changes on business
income, I am going to ignore the increases

16

in taxes on investment income and focus on
the tax increase on business income.17
Upon any increase in individual tax
rates, the income of conduit businesses is
going to face higher taxes, as a significant
portion of their income will be reported on
the returns of individuals with high levels
of AGI (see the Office of Tax Analysis
study). Because the income is reported by
the entity’s owners, and owners will require
the conduit to distribute greater amounts
of cash to cover their tax liabilities, there
will be less accumulation of assets inside the
business. The rate change could be particularly harmful to small business conduits, as
small businesses typically have a more difficult time obtaining external financing.
Consider the implications for S corporations. Using Statistics of Income balance
sheet data, I infer the incremental distributions over the past five years (2005-2009)
from S corporations that would have been
required had the top personal statutory tax
rate been 40%. Presuming that the S corporation’s tax distribution agreement requires
funds to be distributed at the top statutory
tax rate, then all shareholders will receive tax
distributions at this rate.18
Using the assumption that tax distribu-

tions will increase to 40% from 35%, Figure
2 illustrates that at the end of five years, S
corporations would have had $84 billion less
in accumulated assets inside the business.
This constitutes approximately 15% of S
corporations’ working capital.
It is difficult to estimate how much
these incremental taxes will cost firms in
terms of business growth. With the rate
increase two things could happen. First, tax
distributions could be increased as described
above. Second, distributions could be held
constant and owners could simply pay a
greater proportion of their distributions
towards taxes. Over the past five years,
distributions have been between 55% and
76% of profits, suggesting that S corporation
shareholders are receiving distributions in
excess of what is required to cover tax burdens.19 So, the incremental tax burden created by the rate increase could simply result
in the owners using their non-tax distributions for taxes rather than fueling economic
growth through saving, investment in other
businesses, or consumption.

Tension Between Corporate
and Individual Rate Changes
for Businesses

American Economic Review 57, p. 391-414, June 1967.

reduction effectively reduces these assets resulting in a

as the asset write-down could hurt regulatory capital. I

between investments (i.e., when dividend tax rates are

Note that there does appear to be some evidence that

reduction in both net income and total assets in the year

suspect that loss firms are less sensitive to the financial

high, holding all else equal, investors likely prefer holding

any positive response of publicly traded C corporations

of the rate reduction. I believe that only a few groups of

reporting outcome of their loss revaluation. See Michelle

investments that generate greater capital gains relative to

to the rate cut be attenuated by undesirable financial

firms face this unintended consequence – banks which

Hanlon’s February 8, 2012 testimony before the United

dividends). But I am presuming that when choosing to

reporting consequences. Because accounting for income

typically have large deferred tax assets associated with

States House Ways and Means Committee.

enter into any investment, that the potential premium paid

taxes can result in C corporations reporting future tax

their loan loss reserves and firms with large net operating

That is not to say that the increases on investment

by future owners is taxed in the same manner regardless

benefits as assets on their balance sheets, any rate

losses. This effect is not trivial for financial institutions

income do not have an impact on the allocation of capital

of whether the investment is a C corporation or a pass-
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The primary issue is that businesses in passthrough form are going to effectively face a
tax rate increase as compared to businesses
organized as C corporations. So, is it inherently fair that a fast-food franchise owner
organized as a conduit will now potentially
face a 40% tax rate on his/her net business
income whereas an owner organized as a C
corporation will continue to 35% on his/her
net business income? Probably not.
Some surmise that because personal
taxes on dividends and capital gains are
also increasing, there is little potential
inequity, as both conduits and C corporations will be subject to higher tax burdens.
While this is true, non-corporate business
income will face a greater increase for two
reasons. First, 100% of the conduit entity’s
income will be taxed at a 5% higher rate.
By comparison only 65% of the C corporation’s income will be subject to tax at the
higher investment income tax rates (also
increasing 5%; from 15% to 20%), resulting
in only a 3.25% increase in taxes on the C
corporation. Second, the second layer of tax
on C corporations can be deferred to future
periods (due to retaining earnings inside the
enterprise), implying that the present value
of the tax rate increase is much smaller than
the 3.25%.
Many argue that very few pass-throughs
will be affected by the individual rate
increase because only the largest passthroughs generate enough taxable income
to qualify for the upper tax brackets, and
then very few of these are “true” small businesses.20 The Office of Tax Analysis study
above, however, appears to debunk the myth
that only low levels of conduit income (even
small business income) will be subject to
the individual income tax rate increase. But,
from an economic (as opposed to a political)
perspective, why does the “small” business
designation even matter? From an economic
efficiency perspective, business income
should carry similar tax burdens regardless
of the size of the enterprise or its organiza-

through. Said another way, the disparity in tax treatment

From an economic efficiency
perspective, business income
should carry similar tax
burdens regardless of the size
of the enterprise or its organizational form.

theory argues that the ability of owners to
utilize these losses to reduce their tax burdens encourages entrepreneurial risk taking
(i.e., the government is providing a subsidy
equal to the taxes saved).21
Second, conduit entities offer more flexibility for tax-efficient acquisition structures.
Many entrepreneurial enterprises require
external capital to expand the business. This
capital is either infused by some third-party
(e.g., private equity) or through the acquisition of the business by another business
(e.g., Instagram’s acquisition by Facebook).
In either case, being in pass-through form
allows any acquisition premium to be allocated to the business’s assets, which provides
future tax savings through incremental
depreciation (called the tax basis “step-up”).
If the business to be acquired is a C corporation, gaining the incremental depreciation
would be prohibitively expensive. I suspect
that Dell, Apple, Google and Facebook were
all initially organized as conduit entities that
took advantage of venture capital investment
made more affordable by the “step-up.”

Finally, the benefits of being a C corporation result because the owners intend
to hold the business for an indefinite period
and reinvest the earnings into the enterprise.
Recall that any benefits of the C corporation
structure increase in the owners’ holding
period of the business but decrease as the
business distributes dividends.
Congress does have the option to create some special tax treatment for business
income in pass-through form, to offset
the rate increase. Examples include House
Majority Leader Eric Cantor’s proposed
20% tax deduction for businesses with fewer
than 500 employees and the provision of
deductions or credits for a percentage of
each employee’s wages.22 Critics of these
proposals argue that the majority of benefits
will inure to professional service firms (i.e.,
lawyers, doctors, accountants etc.) rather
than the real “job creating” conduit businesses.23
Though the distinction between which
industries create jobs is unsubstantiated and
somewhat arbitrary, there is precedent that
service firms take advantage of organizational forms to garner tax benefits.24 Hence,
the ability of service providers to qualify
for lower tax rates on their net income
is potentially problematic. Consider that
salary income is subject to ordinary tax
rates. There is little a highly compensated
salaried employee can do to avoid high tax
rates. However, professional service firms’
owners and employees are often the same
group of individuals. If the net income of
conduit entities bears a lower tax rate than
salary income (as would be the case under
the Cantor proposal), the owners of the
conduit will be incentivized to reclassify
their wage income as business income. This
is because the wages that they pay themselves are treated as salary income and will
face the highest statutory tax rates, whereas
the income from the business will effectively
be subject to a lower rate. Assuming that
the top personal statutory tax rate is 40%

ing the entity ineligible to be an S corporation.

Americans’ Misunderstanding of Marginal Tax Rates to

I roll-forward retained earnings using the Statistics of In-

Sow Fear About Obama’s Proposed Tax Hikes,” www.

lated profits of the enterprise, not the premium created by

come for aggregate S corporation tax filings. To estimate

slate.com, July 11, 2012.

future investors’ anticipated growth in the enterprise.

distributions, I add current year’s earnings to prior year’s

S corporations are not allowed to make different rates

retained earnings and then subtract the current year’s

Entrepreneurial Risk-Taking: Theory and Evidence for

of distributions to different shareholders as doing so is

retained earnings.

the U.S.” Journal of Public Economics, Vol. 91, 2007,

study “Cantor Proposal for 20 Percent Business Tax De-

See Matthew Yglesias “House Republicans Exploit

0.1479-1505 and William M. Gentry and Glenn R. Hub-

duction Would Provide Windfall for Wealthy, Not Create

between conduits and C corporations is on the accumu-
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tional form.
Conduit entities do have the option to
convert to C corporations to take advantage
of the lower corporate tax rate. This course
of action has some drawbacks, however.
First, if the business’s income is highly
volatile (i.e., net losses can sometimes be
expected), then being a C corporation will
prevent the owner from being able to use
any losses to offset other income. Economic

deemed to create a second class of stock thereby mak-
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bard, “Success Taxes, Entrepreneurial Entry, and Innovation,” NBER Working Paper, vol. 1055, 2004.
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See Julie B. Cullen and Roger H. Gordon “Taxes and

Martin A. Sullivan’s March 7, 2012 testimony before the
United States House Ways and Means Committee.
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See Chuck Marr’s Center on Budget and Policy Priorities

and that the top tax rate on business income
would be 32% (assuming 20% deduction
of net income), for each dollar an owneremployee reduces his/her salary (which
increases the net income of the conduit) and
then increases cash distributions from the
business, he/she saves $0.08. Ignoring any
payroll taxes, for a $100,000 salary reduction
and accompanying increase in distribution,
this strategy yields the owner-employee an
additional $8,000.25
Any proposal intended to alleviate the
potential tax rate increase on conduit businesses needs to be carefully crafted and narrowly targeted so as to benefit the appropriate constituency. Although such an endeavor
is worthy, any proposal is likely going to
have to be extremely unwieldy in order
to prevent abuse. The complexity of such
legislation will be confounded by the lack
of clear definition as to what constitutes a
“small business.” As many factions will have
their proverbial fingers in the pot, I worry
that any resulting business tax relief legislation will be so complex that “true” small
businesses will be unwilling to invest the
time to take advantage of the tax benefits
and so the legislation will be for naught.26

Base Broadening versus Rate
Increases
Although both parties agree that revenues
need to be raised, they are in complete
disagreement as to how to accomplish this
feat. Democrats insist on rate increases;
Republicans insist on eliminating deductions. Although both proposals will raise
revenues, I conjecture that the elimination
of deductions, rather than the imposition of
rate increases, will have a slightly more congruous effect across businesses in different
organizational forms. Clearly, the Democrats’ proposal (inadvertently?) taxes conduit
businesses more heavily than C corporation
businesses. Reducing individual deductions
systematically applies to all business owners
regardless of their organizational structures.
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For example, both C corporation and conduit owners will face the same limits on the
deductibility of home mortgage interest.
But conduit businesses may still face a
bigger tax hike for at least two reasons. First,
the proposed limitation of deductions phases
in when taxpayers report $200,000 or more
of adjusted gross income. Because conduit
owners report all of the income on their personal returns, they will likely hit the deduction limitation thresholds more frequently
than C corporation owners (recall that C
corporation owners only report dividends
and capital gains on their personal returns).
Second, some of the proposed limitations of deductions stem from expenses
generated from their businesses. For
example, charitable contributions are treated
as flowing through the conduit entity onto
the returns of the owners. So, if their business makes charitable contributions, then
these deductions will be subject to limitation
under the more stringent individual rules
rather than the less stringent C corporation
rules.
State and local income taxes are another
example of where deductions will be more
limited for conduits than C corporations.
Unfortunately, the Republicans have been
rather sparse on the details of their deduction limitation proposal. Though it may be
slightly preferable to conduit businesses as
compared to across-the-board individual
rate increases, I worry that once the incremental compliance burden is considered that
the Republican proposal will be scrapped.

V.
Summary
Pass-through businesses represent a substantial portion of aggregate taxable income
from businesses. The conduit organizational form is in place to reduce the effects
of double taxation on business profits,
particularly on organizations that have less
opportunity to raise affordable external

Jobs,” May 22, 2012.

incorporate and have their customers pay a variety of

Professional Service Corporations (or PSCs) are C cor-

different corporations for their services thereby taking

porations that have a substantial portion of their profits

advantage of the progressive corporate tax rate.

derived from professional services (i.e., law, medicine,
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capital. However, recently proposed tax
legislation reduces taxation on C corporation businesses while raising them on the
conduit sector. Although C corporation tax
reform is needed, it seems unfair to pay for
such overhaul by increasing the taxes on
the income of conduit businesses. Although
there are no precise estimates of the effect of
the individual income tax rates on conduit
businesses’ growth and productivity, there is
much anecdotal evidence that small conduit
businesses could reduce hiring and/or capital
investment.27
Perhaps the disparate tax increase on
conduits could be partially mitigated by the
establishment of a threshold for assessing
the higher tax rates on individuals before
non-corporate business income. This would
at least limit the conduit income subject to
the higher tax rates to individuals who have
substantial amounts of income from nonbusiness sources. However, there will have to
be some provision to limit conduit business
owners from re-characterizing their salary
income as conduit income to avoid higher
taxes on their salaries. Overall, the goal of
any reform should be to tax similar types of
income at similar rates.

in taxes.
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American Jobs Creation Act of 2004 as an example of

If the owner-employee received the incremental $100,000

architecture etc.). Their profits are taxed at the highest

he/she would have $60,000 after taxes. By reducing sal-

corporate statutory tax rate. PSCs originated because

ary, the employee increases the income of the conduit by

professional service provides realized that they could

$100,000 which will only create an incremental $32,000

See the Domestic Manufacturing Deduction from the
unwieldy legislation.
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Businesses,” The Wall Street Journal, January 3, 2013.
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